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1. Introduction
    
The  empirical  analysis  of  the  factors  that  determine 
technical inefficiencies in the sport industry has been a topic of 
intense research in the economic and sport literature; see Hofler 
and Payne (2006), Kahane (2005) and Simmons and Frick (2008).  In 
these studies, the focus is mainly on the ability of one layer of 
management (the coach) to extract the best possible performance 
from the players given his budget (Kahane, 2005 and Simmons and 
Frick, 2008) or team strategy (Hofler and Payne, 2006) but not on 
the overall ability of the organization to transform its potential 
power over resources to the best possible outcome.
Estimating the overall efficiency of different organizations 
in  dealing  with  their  resources  is  relevant  in  the  field  of 
industrial organization.  However, this is usually not an easy 
task, mainly because of the difficulties one has to face in order 
to obtain good proxies of some unobservable variables, such as 
“power”  or  “performance”  of  the  different  firms  in  a  given 
industry.  The analysis of sport results and its correlation with 
some features of the clubs that can be thought to be related to 
endowment provides a plausible answer to this issue.  For example, 
Buraimo et al. (2007) report high correlation, for the 92 clubs in 
English professional football, between the potential of a club (as 
represented by variables capturing its geography and history) and 
both the club’s revenue and its ranking in the league.  This is 
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also  consistent  with  the  central  proposition  of  the  most 
influential theoretical model in sports economics, the two team 
league  model  of  El-Hodiri  and  Quirk  (1971),  that  large  market 
clubs  will  dominate  small  market  clubs  because  they  generate 
greater revenue and hire better players.  For example, a club may 
be located in a large city and have won many trophies in the past. 
This ‘big’ club would therefore have a larger fan and revenue base 
that its rivals and greater power in the player labour market.  If 
both clubs are managed efficiently, the ‘big’ club is expected to 
win more matches than the small club. 
This paper is an empirical analysis on the presence of x-
inefficiency  in  the  top  division  of  the  Chilean  and  Italian 
football leagues through the estimation of stochastic production 
frontiers.  According to the previous discussion, our econometric 
specification  relates  team  performance  to  a  set  of  power 
indicators (history and past results) while stochastic deviations 
of  this  function  can  be  explained  by  managerial  decision 
variables.   Moreover,  the  comparative  analysis  of  these  two 
extreme cases, one a very modest league and the other amongst the 
most  important  in  the  world,  is  a  novel  aspect  of  our  paper 
compared to related literature on sport, which usually focuses on 
a  single  national  league.   This  comparison  is  especially 
interesting given that, compared to the Italian league, clubs in 
the Chilean league face a lower demand and are in principle more 
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likely to be affected by financial restrictions that prevent them 
from achieving the highest possible performance.  
    We find evidence of technical inefficiencies in both the 
Chilean and the Italian leagues.  However, an important difference 
is  that,  in  the  Italian  league,  a  significant  share  of  team 
performance is due to stochastic shocks related to the efficiency 
of club management; by contrast, stochastic elements do not play a 
significant role in the Chilean league.  This difference can be 
explained by the presence of simpler and smaller clubs in the 
Chilean league that could be due to the different size of the 
market and/or to financial constraints faced by small clubs in 
that country.
    In the next section of the paper, we provide some theoretical 
insights about the relationship between institutional complexity 
and  managerial  effort.  Section  3  presents  and  describes  the 
variables  used  in  the  analysis  and  Section  4  explains  the 
econometric  approach  used  to  estimate  the  impact  of  resource 
variables and technical inefficiencies on output in the Chilean 
and Italian football and discusses the results of the estimation. 
Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2. Guidance from theory
In this section we develop intuition about the relationship 
between managerial effort and institutional complexity. In other 
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to do this we assume the framework proposed by Paolini and Tena 
(2012), which is an extended version of two-team models in the 
field of sport economics [El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971), Haan et al. 
(2002) and Késenne (2007)].
In this framework there are two teams that play a series of 
matches  against  each  other.  Each  of  the  teams  has  to 
simultaneously decide its level of capital and managerial effort 
in order to maximize its profit function. These two variables have 
a positive impact on revenue, as they increase the likelihood of 
winning but, on the other hand, it is increasingly costly for a 
team to augment its level of capital and managerial effort. The 
latter effect is more important because, while the revenue of the 
teams  is  bound  and  subject  to  decreasing  returns,  costs  can 
undergo infinite growth. This is a common and realistic assumption 
in theoretical models and ensures the existence of an equilibrium 
level for both variables (see Mas-Collel et al. (1995), Chapter 
5). 
The  model  involves  two  key  assumptions.  The  first  is  a 
negative relationship between managerial effort and institutional 
complexity.  This  is  a  plausible  hypothesis  given  that  it  is 
logical to assume that the amount of effort required to run an 
institution is an increasing function of the institution’s level 
of capital. The second is that the cost of capital for a given 
team is positively affected by the amount invested by its rival. 
The  reason  is  that  if  a  club  invests  heavily  to  attract  star 
players,  football  fans  and  media  attention,  it  will  leave  a 
smaller portion of the market for its rival. 
In these conditions, the model’s equilibrium states that 1) 
there is an optimal level of managerial effort for each team, 
given capital investment, and 2) the equilibrium levels of the two 
team’s capital and managerial effort are inversely related. These 
statements  are  the  natural  consequences  of  our  two  assumptions 
concerning  the  negative  relationship  between  effort  and 
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institutional  complexity  and  the  increasing  cost  of  capital 
investment.
In  this  framework,  it  becomes  interesting  to  analyse  how 
managerial effort in each team reacts to changes in capital. For 
example,  assume  that  one  of  the  teams  suddenly  increases  its 
capital. This will make capital more expensive for the rival team 
and  it  will  then  react  by  reducing  its  level  of  capital  and 
increasing its managerial effort due to the negative relationship 
between  these  two  variables.  Significantly,  this  implies  that 
teams with low capital, either because of reduced market size or 
financial  market  restrictions,  will  react  by  increasing  their 
level of managerial effort. 
According to this hypothesis, it is interesting to analyse 
the importance of managerial variables in two extreme cases, one 
in  which  the  level  of  capital  of  different  clubs  is  clearly 
constrained by the size of the market (the Chilean league) and 
another that involves large, complex teams (the Italian league). 
The model would predict that managerial effort would be greater 
and, therefore, managerial inefficiency less important in Chile 
than in Italy. 
Of course, as discussed in the introduction, this analysis 
requires  considering  the  total  endowment  of  the  teams.  In  our 
particular  framework  this  is  a  much  broader  measure  than  the 
budget  for  players,  which  is  very  likely  to  be  endogenously 
affected by performance expectations; more importantly, it does 
not  include  all  the  information  available  about  the  team’s 
capital.  In  professional  football,  this  measure  of  capital  is 
largely  intangible  as  it  includes  branding.  However,  it  is 
reasonable  to  assume  that  this  intangible  capital  is  highly 
correlated  with  a  set  of  proxy  variables  that  should  include 
stadium  capacity  and  the  team’s  history  (see  Buraimo  et  al. 
(2007)). Also included in the group of endowment variables is the 
size of the city, as an indicator of the potential number of team 
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supporters.  For  example,  the  Nielsen  Institute  reports  each 
Italian  team’s  number  of  supporters  (‘tifosi’)  in  Series  A  in 
2008.  The  teams  with  the  largest  numbers  of  followers  were 
Juventus,  F.C.  Internazionale  di  Milano,  A.C.  Milan  and  Roma, 
which belong to the three largest Italian cities: Turin, Milan and 
Rome. The teams with less supporters are from small cities such as 
Verona, Lecce and Siena. We do not have such detailed information 
for the Chilean league but it is typically won by a team from 
Santiago, the country’s largest city.
3. Data on the Italian and Chilean football league.
Our season-level variables relate to the period from 1992/93 
to 2007/08 in the case of Italy and from season 1993 to 2008 in 
the  case  of  Chile.  During  the  sample  period,  for  the  Italian 
Series A, there have been 18 teams before 2004/05 and 20 teams 
afterwards.   Before  season  2004/05  4  teams  were  promoted  and 
relegated and 3 teams afterwards. The best 4 teams qualify for the 
Champions  League  while  teams  can  qualify  to  the  Europa  League 
either by winning the Italian Cup or by ending up in the 5th or 6th 
position in the national league. In the case of Chile, the first 
division was composed of 16 teams until 2004 and, since then, 20, 
19, 21 and 20 for seasons 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 respectively. 
Each season is composed of two competitions: Opening (‘Apertura’) 
and Closing (‘Clausura’). The champion of each tournament and the 
best second ranked automatically qualified for the most important 
international competition at the club level in South America: Copa 
de America.
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The following variables are considered in both cases 
Output (performance) measure
 (i) Number of points divided by the maximum available for 
the ith team in season t ( y i , t ). Although during sample period 
the number of points awarded for a victory changed from two to 
three in season 1995/96 for the Italian league and 1996 for the 
Chilean league, to make the performance measure consistent across 
seasons we computed it on the basis of three points for a win 
throughout the whole period.  A dummy variable is used in the 
estimation to represent the seasons when three points was actually 
employed as the change in incentives was likely to have influenced 
the  pattern  of  results.   Simmons  and  Frick  (2008)  followed  a 
similar procedure for Germany.
Group I (variables related to resources)
 (ii) International tournament ( x1, i ,t ): dummy that takes the 
value 1 when club i is playing in that season's European Champion 
League (Italy) or Copa de Libertadores (Chile) at season t.
 (iii) Stadium capacity ( x2, i ,t ).
 (iv) Population size of the city (where the team plays its 
home games) ( x3, i ,t ).
 (v) Champion in previous years ( x4, i ,t ): a weighted sum of 
the  number  of  national  league  trophies  in  the  previous  three 
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years. The weights were (1/t²) where t was 1 for the previous 
season, 2 for the season before and 3 for the season before that.
 (vi)  Performance  in  previous  years  ( x5, i ,t ):  a  weighted 
measure of the inverse of the ranking of each team in each of the 
top  division  competitions  in  the  preceding  three  years. 
Performance is equal to zero in case a team has been in the second 
division. Weights are defined similarly to the previous variable.
 (vi) Capital city ( x6, i ,t ): a dummy variable that takes the 
value  one  when  the  team  plays  in  the  capital  of  the  country, 
Santiago de Chile in the case of Chile and Rome in the case of 
Italy. 
Group II (variables related to technical decisions)
 (viii) Total number of players ( z1, t , t ): total number of 
footballers in each squad.
 (ix)  Number  of  foreigners  ( z2, i , t )::  total  number  of 
foreigners for each club.
 (x)  %  goalkeepers  ( z3, i ,t ):  share  of  goalkeepers  in  the 
squad.
 (xi) % defenders ( z4, i , t ): share of defenders in the squad.
(xii)  % midfielders  ( z5, i ,t ): share  of midfielders  in the 
squad. 
 (xiii) Number of high scoring players ( z6, i ,t ): number of 
players at each club who had scored more than twenty goals in the 
previous  season.  Note  that  this  number  of  goals  is  an  ad-hoc 
decision  to  account  for  the  presence  of  potential  outstanding 
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scoring players in the team. Of course, this variable could be 
affected by many events that could not fixed through time such as 
injuries, the presence of international competitions at the club 
or national level and the number of teams in the league. However, 
it is difficult to takes all these events into account based on 
subjective appreciation and because of this we do not change the 
definition  of  this  variable  through  the  sample.  We  acknowledge 
this as a potential weakness of our analysis to be explored in 
future research.
 (xiv) Manager quality ( z7, i ,t ): proportion of matches won 
during the career of the manager of the club prior to season t.
 (xv) Manager experience ( z8, i ,t ): number of years that the 
coach of the team has been involved in managerial activities.
 (xvi) Foreign manager ( z9i , t ): a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 when the manager is a foreigner and zero otherwise.
All these variables are collected at the beginning of the 
season to avoid potential endogeneity problems.
Table  1  displays  some  descriptive  statistics.  The  average 
values for many of the variables are very similar in Italy and 
Chile. The most relevant differences between the two leagues can 
be  observed  in  stadium  capacity  that  on  average  takes  higher 
values for the Italian football. Also, size of the city reveals 
that top division teams are more concentrated in the big cities 
for the Chilean football league (mainly in the capital Santiago de 
Chile) whereas in Italy there are top football teams in relatively 
small cities. This is the case for example of Atlanta, Livorno, 
Empoli, Siena and Udinense. Some important differences also relate 
to  the  number  of  foreign  players  and  managers  in  the  two 
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countries.  As  expected,  the  Italian  league  attracts  a  higher 
number of foreigners.
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE]
4. Empirical Results
    The model of stochastic frontier production functions was 
initially developed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van 
den Broeck (1977) and extended to panel data by Battese and Coelli 
(1995).  The standard specification for a set of firms indexed by 
i over a number of periods t can be represented as:
Y i ,t=α+ β ' x i ,t+ (ν i ,t+υi , t ) i=1,… , N ;t=1,… , T (1)
where Y i ,t  is a measure of firm i’s output at time t, x i ,t  is a 
vector of the inputs defined in the previous section and β is a 
vector of unknown coefficients to be estimated.  A common practice 
in the literature is to take logs of variables  Y i ,t  and  x i ,t . 
However, here we do not apply this transformation of the dependent 
variable as it is already defined as a ratio (points divided by 
maximum possible points in a season)2.
 The remainder of the equation is an error term composed of 
two components: 1)  ν i ,t  is a random error term assumed to be 
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iid N (0,σ ν2 ) ; and 2) υi , t  is a non-negative random error term that 
is assumed to be independent and following a normal distribution 
that  is  truncated  at  zero  and  iid N (mi ,t , σ υ2)  with  mean 
inefficiency, mi ,t , modelled as a function of various firm-level 
factors.  Specifically,
mi ,t=δ ' zi ,t+wi ,t (2)
where z i ,t  is a vector of technical decisions undertaken by firm i 
in  period  t  and  δ  is  another  vector  of  coefficients  to  be 
estimated.  The error term is assumed to be iid N (0,σ w2 )  truncated 
at −δ ' z i , t  for consistency with the assumption that υi , t  is non-
negative and truncated at zero.
The model presented in equations (1) and (2) is estimated 
following the maximum likelihood method proposed by Battese and 
Coelli  (1993)  and  made  available  in  Coelli's  (1996)  computer 
program FRONTIER 4.1. The parameter γ=(σ υ2 )/ (σν2+σ υ2 ) .takes values in 
[0,1 ]  and it is particularly important as it shows the proportion 
of  the  sum  of  the  two  error  variances  that  is  accounted  by 
technical  inefficiencies.   When  this  parameter  is  not 
statistically  different  from  zero  then  it  is  not  possible  to 
reject the null hypothesis of zero technical inefficiencies and 
the  specification  should  be  a  standard  panel  data  econometric 
procedure to estimate the production function.  
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As  discussed  in  the  introduction,  since  our  focus  is  not 
specifically on coach but on the efficiency of the organization as 
a  whole,  the  production  frontier  is  not  taken  by  relating 
performance to the quality of the playing staff at the club as 
proxied by its total wage bill. Another important reason for not 
including the wage bill in this study is that the size of the 
budget at each club was not available at all in the case of Chile; 
even  for  Italy,  the  figures  for  wage  bills  were  probably 
unreliable  - either because clubs had an incentive to misreport 
or  simply  because  complex  bonus  arrangements  make  it  hard  to 
represent  a  club's  financial  commitment  with  a  single  summary 
figure3.  Note also that, given their focus on coaching ability, 
the wage bill is properly taken as exogenous in the empirical 
models of Kahane (2005) and Simmons and Frick (2008) but its size 
will in fact be influenced by expected team performance that year. 
Accordingly, our Group I explanatory variables, the x i ,t  in 
equation (1), seek to represent factors from the geography and 
history of the club that should, collectively, determine its power 
to command resources.  The task of management in the organization 
is to translate power into output (points).  Decisions are, of 
course, taken at a number of levels in the club.  In the stylized 
club  we  have  in  mind,  the  owners  (perhaps  represented  by  the 
chairman) or other senior managers hire a coach.  The coach is 
then co-opted into management and may well have some input in the 
recruitment of the playing staff with whatever budget has been 
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made available (in some cases a director of football will play the 
primary role here).  Errors of judgment may be made, for example, 
by the chairman (who may choose a lower quality coach to work with 
the more expensive players whom the club can then afford) or by 
the director of football (who may use his budget to hire a sub-
optimal balance of stars and journeymen or international and local 
players).  Poor decisions at any level of management will prevent 
the  club  from  reaching  the  level  of  performance  (in  terms  of 
league points) that should be possible given its power and status. 
In our specification of equation (2) above, the z i ,t  (the Group II 
variables)  represent  a  selection  of  such  technical  decisions. 
Studying them would not yield any conclusions if the management 
team at every club operated with maximum efficiency because then 
each club would be achieving the level of sporting performance 
commensurate with its endowment of power.
Table 2 presents generalized likelihood-ratio tests of the 
null hypothesis, that the inefficiency effects are absent from the 
model and that decision variables are jointly insignificant.  A 
general  result  for  all  the  specifications  is  that  inefficiency 
effects are highly significant in both the Italian and the Chilean 
leagues.
[INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE]
Table 3 reports results from the estimation of the stochastic 
frontiers  for  the  two  leagues  (for  Italy,  columns  (2)  to  (4) 
relate to re-estimation in robustness tests reported below; the 
lead results are in column (1)). The core finding is from the 
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estimation  of  γ  that  suggests  a  more  important  role  of 
stochastic shocks in managerial decisions in the Italian compared 
to the Chilean league.
[INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE]
Among the Group I variables, the results for Italy show that 
the  size  of  the  team’s  home  city  is  indeed  an  important 
determinant  of  the  level  of  achievement  of  a  football  club. 
However, the benefit from city size is mitigated by location in 
the capital city; this could reflect diminishing returns to city 
size in the sports sector (Buraimo et al., 2009) or the fact that, 
in the Italian context, the capital city usually hosts competing 
high level football clubs that split the market.  Stadium capacity 
(for a given size of city) is shown to have a negative impact on 
performance.  Possibly managers with a large number of seats to 
fill relative to the size of the local market will have to price 
tickets lower: with the inelastic demand claimed to prevail in 
sports  markets  in  developed  countries  (Fort,  2006),  this  will 
imply depressed revenue compared with what would be expected given 
the size of the city.  Results on these spatial variables are 
different in Chile.  There population itself is not significant 
but location in Santiago de Chile assuredly is.  This combination 
of results likely reflects that a high proportion of clubs are 
located in the capital and, given they all have the same value for 
city size, this will prevent the importance of population size per 
se from being detected in the estimation.  In contrast to Italy, 
Chilean clubs have faced restrictions on their ability to finance 
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stadium development and therefore it is unsurprising that stadium 
size is a positive predictor of performance in this case.  While 
results on these spatial variables display contrasts between Italy 
and Chile, the history variables yield similar findings: a history 
of achievement raises performance in the current period.  Again, 
this is consistent with the importance of market size as clubs 
that  were  successful  in  the  past  will  have  collected  more 
supporters on the way to the present.
Our  Group  II  variables  test  for  effects  from  several 
individual  categories  of  technical  managerial  decisions.   The 
choice of coach is shown to matter substantially.  For Italy, 
similar to Simmons and Frick (2008) for Germany, we find that the 
quality of the coach (as reflected in his career win-ratio) is 
important but his length of experience has no independent role. 
Since it is inefficiency that is being modelled, the negative sign 
indicates that clubs who employ a coach with a better than average 
career record tend to be the clubs which are more efficient in 
converting status to sporting performance.  The same is found in 
Chile.   One  of  several  possible  explanations  is  that  decision 
takers  at  some  clubs  undervalue  coaching  relative  to  player 
inputs.  Note that we do not include a variable to account for the 
influence of a new manager (compared to the one who finished the 
previous season).  The reason is that for the Chilean league we do 
not have information about the manager of teams playing in the 
second  division  the  previous  year  and  here  we  show  a  similar 
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estimation  in  both  countries  for  the  purpose  of  comparison. 
However, when we run a similar estimation of Italy, including this 
variable, there are not significant changes in our results; the 
proportion of error variance due to technical inefficiencies is 
still significant (0.928 with a t-value of 12.22) and the variable 
new  manager  exerts  a  negative  impact  (but  not  significantly 
different from zero) on performance.  This result accords with 
previous analysis by Tena and Forrest (2008) using match level 
data, who suggest that a new manager has only a very small effect 
and  then  only  for  a  small  number  of  matches  (scapegoat 
hypothesis).
Players’ wages account for the largest part of expenditure by 
professional  sports  teams  and  it  is  clearly  key  that  whatever 
budget is available is spent judiciously.  One trade-off clubs 
face  is  between  the  number  of  players  on  the  roster  and  the 
average quality of players (higher quality players are likely to 
be more expensive) and a striking feature from Table 3 is the very 
high variance in squad size.  In both countries, clubs with a 
below average squad size appear to be more efficient than those 
who  opt  for  fewer  players.   Perhaps  the  former  enjoy  greater 
success  because  of  substitution  of  quality  for  quantity  or  it 
could be that players in a small squad benefit from getting more 
playing time.  Of course, it is also (just) possible that clubs 
who  employ  a  higher  number  of  personnel  understand  that  this 
lowers expected performance but accept the fact because they are 
risk averse and, for example, want to guard against the adverse 
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consequences  of  an  exceptional  number  of  injuries.   The  same 
remark qualifies the finding that a higher number of goalkeepers 
in  the  squad  (in  Italy)  appears  to  be  associated  with  lower 
efficiency.  But the ratios of defenders and midfielders are not 
significant explanatory variables in either country, so that there 
seems  to  be  efficient  decision  taking  across  the  clubs  with 
respect  to  the  balance  of  different  categories  of  outfielder 
(notwithstanding  that  relative  numbers  display  high  variation 
across clubs).
As an additional robustness test we analyse the impact of 
including a new decision variable in the model, new coach, that is 
defined as a dummy variable that takes value one when the manager 
of the team at the beginning of the season is different from the 
one at the end of the previous season.  In this case, we are 
obliged  to  drop  observations  from  teams  playing  in  the  second 
division the previous year as information about this variable does 
not  exist  for  teams  in  the  Chilean  league.   Results  of  this 
estimation reflect that now the efficiency hypothesis is rejected 
in  both  cases  because  the  Chilean  league  is  particularly 
inefficient in replacing old managers.  However, also in this case 
the proportion of variance due to technical inefficiencies (and 
also its associate t-statistics) is substantially larger in the 
Italian compared to the Chilean league.
From the results, a particularly tricky decision for football 
clubs  (as  will  be  the  case  for  managers  in  other  creative 
industries,  such  as  opera  or  research)  is  the  proportion  of 
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resources to be used on star performers.  In football, these are 
usually successful strikers, defined here by the variable `number 
of high scoring players'.  This attracts a negative coefficient 
estimate for both countries, implying that clubs who choose to 
employ  none  or  only  a  small  number  will  fail  to  reach  the 
production frontier.  The implication that some clubs undervalue 
genuine  strikers  is  weakened,  of  course,  if  there  are  labour 
market imperfections that restrict their movement away from their 
current clubs.
    The degree of efficiency shown by a club in the Italian 
League  also  appears  to  be  associated  with  its  propensity  to 
recruit foreign players compared with other clubs.  Just as Kahane 
(2005)  demonstrated  that  clubs  which  displayed  a  reluctance  to 
employ francophone ice hockey players tended to pay a price in 
terms of lower levels of performance, so here a club with a below 
average number of foreigners is shown to fare worse as a result. 
Recent papers have highlighted the beneficial effects of foreign 
players in increasing the probability of success of the national 
team (Alvarez et al., 2011 report this effect and attribute it to 
spillover  effects  that  raise  the  ability  level  of  domestic 
players)  and  in  increasing  the  level  of  competitiveness  in 
domestic leagues (Flores et al., 2010).  However, no significant 
effect is found in Chile, probably because its weak league cannot 
attract quality foreign footballers who would provide better value 
than local players.
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Broadly,  the  results  of  the  model  imply  that,  while 
historical and geographical variables intended to capture market 
size play their expected roles in both Italy and Chile, impacts 
from the pattern of technical decisions across clubs tend to have 
a generally lower magnitude in Chile.  To test the robustness of 
these results, we analyze now the implications of two different 
set of experiments.  These estimations are also shown in Table 3. 
More specifically, our first group of experiments refers possible 
distortions resulting from penalties imposed on clubs for illegal 
activities (mainly match fixing scandals) in the Italian league 
during seasons 2004/05, 2005/06 and 2006/07.  We eliminate these 
three seasons from the sample and estimate the model again.  Main 
results were also robust to this experiment.
The model was also estimated for different definitions of 
variables for the Italian case.  More specifically, we consider a 
dummy variable that takes value 1 when the team is located in any 
of the biggest four Italian cities: Rome, Milan, Naples and Turin. 
Conclusions  are  not  affected  in  either  case  and  the  null  of 
managerial efficiency could be rejected in both instances at the 
1% level.4
Another set of experiments relates to the inclusion of the size of 
the city. As discussed earlier, this is a controversial indicator 
as it is a proxy variable for market size. We experimented with 
some alternative definitions of market size such as the number of 
inhabitants in the city divided by the number of clubs however 
this variable turned out not significant in any case what suggests 
that, at least in the long run, the size of the market in a given 
city is not exogenously given but it could be stimulated by the 
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competition  of  rival  neighbour  teams.  We  also  studied  if  some 
alternative variables related not only to the number of citizens 
but also to income could have a significant impact on performance. 
More specifically, we run the baseline estimation but replacing 
the number of citizens by (1) income per-capita in the city and 
(2)  total  income  in  the  city.  Results  of  this  estimation  are 
reported in Table 4. Note that the main conclusions of the paper 
uphold  and,  interestingly,  income  per-capita  (total  income)  is 
only  significant  for  Chile  (Italy).  This  suggests  that  the 
relevant  market  size  indicator  for  a  football  team  could  be 
different for developed and developing countries. Indeed, it is 
plausible to assume that a minimum level of income is needed to 
become  a  football  fan  and,  once  this  threshold  is  surpassed, 
football  stops  being  a  luxury  good,  so  total  demand  largely 
depends on the number of potential supporters.5
[INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE]
5. Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the relationship between resource inputs 
and managerial efficiency on firms by the estimation of stochastic 
production frontiers for the top divisions in Chilean and Italian 
football.  Unlike previous research, we focus not only on coach 
efficiency  but  on  the  ability  of  the  whole  organization  to 
transform its potential power over resources to the best possible 
outcome in terms of league points. Results indicate the presence 
of  technical  inefficiencies  in  both  cases  but  technical 
inefficiencies play a more important role in the Italian League.
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Future lines of research are suggested by this work.  First, 
an important branch of the sport literature is devoted to study 
the factors that explain differences in competitive balance; see, 
for  example,  Butler  (1995),  Flores  et  al.  (2010)  and  Horowitz 
(1997).  Given that our results show how the impact of different 
variables  on  results  performance  depends  on  indicators  of 
geography and history as well as managerial decisions undertaken 
by  the  clubs,  it  would  be  interesting  to  study  the  relative 
importance of these variables in order to explain differences in 
competitive balances for sport competitions. Besides, given that 
power indicators are not fixed in time but it could be affected by 
market fluctuations as well as changes in the regulations, the 
model provides insight about how manager effort and the structure 
of the competition will be affected by these changes. Regarding to 
this  issue,  it  is  expected  that  some  of  the  highly  indebted 
Italian  teams  will  be  affected  by  the  UEFA’s  “Financial  Fair 
Play”. According to our estimation, this change will reduce the 
amount  of  investment  and  make  the  result  of  the  Italian 
competition more dependent on power indicators.    
Finally,  it  is  critical  to  understand  why  the  relative 
importance  power  depends  on  the  structure  of  national 
competitions.  Our results suggest that in smaller and simpler 
clubs power variables explain a more important share of results 
than in the case of clubs competing in top tournaments, while the 
opposite holds for managerial decision variables.  Developing a 
22
theoretical model that provides an explanation for this result is 
an issue to be explored in future research.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Italy Chile
Average Variance Min Max Average Variance Min Max
Points divided by máximum 0.472 0.020 0 0.851 0.471 0.017 0.144 0.833
Capital 0.138 0.119 0 1 0.395 0.240 0 1
International tournament 0.194 0.157 0 1 0.172 0.143 0 1
Stadium capacity (scale 1/100000) 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.008 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.053
Size of the city (scale 1/1000.000) 0.091 0.007 0.007 0.271 0.190 0.044 0.001 0.467
Champion in previous years 0.130 0.119 0 1.833 0.143 0.110 0 1.583
Performance in previous years 0.909 0.094 0.121 1.539 0.928 0.080 0.333 1.521
Number of foreigners 8.039 20.756 0 24 3.953 1.804 0 7
Total number of players 25.836 11.575 17 36 26.219 18.836 18 43
% goalkeepers 0.087 0.001 0.036 0.167 0.090 0.001 0.036 0.174
% defenders 0.326 0.002 0.174 0.448 0.306 0.003 0.136 0.48
% midfielders 0.370 0.003 0.227 0.538 0.376 0.004 0.214 0.545
% forwards 0.217 0.003 0.095 0.44 0.228 0.002 0.12 0.423
Number of high scoring players 1.190 0.639 0 4 0.974 1.301 0 7
Manager quality 0.374 0.021 0 0.697 0.310 0.032 0 0.705
Manager experience 2.224 2.772 1 13 3.957 14.653 0 17
Foreign manager 0.138 0.119 0 1 0.330 0.222 0 1
New manager 0.409 0.243 0 1 0.451 0.249 0 1
  
27
Table  2.  Tests  of  hypotheses  for  parameters  of  the 
inefficiency frontier in the Italian and Chilean Leagues
Italy Chile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (5)
Null Hypothesis:  H 0: γ=δ0=…=δ11=0
Test statistic 181.99
(***)
215.49
(***)
183.52
(***)
183.70
(***)
133.04
(***)
39.33
(***)
32.21
(***)
Null Hypothesis: H 0: δ0=…=δ 11=0
Test statistic 157.72
(***)
205.38
(***)
161.08
(***)
159.3
(***)
115.7
(***)
39.32
(***)
32.32
(***)
(1) Estimation including all teams in the top division. (2) Estimation excluding observations from seasons 2004/05, 
2005/06 and 2006/07. (3) Estimation similar to (1) but variable ‘Capital’ refers to the capital of any Italian province. 
(4) Estimation similar to (1) but variable ‘Capital’ refers to any of the 4 biggest Italian cities. (5) Estimation similar 
to (1) but including the variable “new manager” in the estimation and dropping teams that were in the second division the 
previous year. ***, **, * denotes rejection at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance level respectively. 
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Table 3. Stochastic Production Frontier Estimation for the 
Italian and Chilean League.
   Italy Chile 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (5) 
Intercept �0 0.788 (13.46) 
(***) 
0.755 
(24.74) 
(***) 
0.788 
(8.30) 
(***) 
0.790 
(8.91) 
(***) 
0.996 
(5.41) 
(***) 
0.359 
(21.55) 
(***) 
0.366 
(10.74) 
(***) 
3 points dummy �1 0.049 (3.23) 
(***) 
0.051 
(12.24) 
(***) 
0.051 
(3.33) 
(***) 
0.051 
(4.30) 
(***) 
0.066 
(3.52) 
(***) 
0.038 
(2.06) 
(***) 
0.046 
(2.43) 
(***) 
Capital �2 -0.099 (-2.35) 
(***) 
-0.069 
(-1.73) 
(*) 
0.004 
(0.30) 
0.010 
(0.42) 
-0.095 
(-1.69) 
(*) 
0.057 
(4.04) 
(***) 
-0.044 
(-3.12) 
(***) 
International 
tournament 
�3 0.008 (0.55) 
0.002 
(0.13) 
0.013 
(0.73) 
0.013 
(0.71) 
0.013 
(0.66) 
0.047 
(2.10) 
(***) 
0.037 
(1.93) 
(*) 
Stadium capacity �4 -7.491 (-2.25) 
(***) 
-7.113 
(-2.95) 
(***) 
-1.897 
(-0.47) 
-2.046 
(-0.44) 
-13.74 
(-2.14) 
(***) 
5.429 
(3.09) 
(***) 
4.769 
(2.92) 
(***) 
Size of city �5 0.732 (3.43) 
(***) 
0.582 
(2.52) 
(***) 
0.243 
(2.51) 
(***) 
0.215 
(1.99) 
(*) 
0.79 
(2.47) 
(***) 
0.244 
(0.58) 
0.382 
(0.80) 
Champion in 
previous years 
�6 -0.011 (-0.68) 
0.021 
(1.23) 
-0.008 
(-0.42) 
-0.009 
(-0.54) 
-0.02 
(-1.15) 
0.049 
(2.05) 
 
0.016 
(0.71) 
Performance in 
previous years 
�7 0.029 (1.78) 
(*) 
0.027 
(3.01) 
(***) 
0.030 
(1.99) 
(**) 
0.028 
(1.79) 
(*) 
0.06 
(1.85) 
(*) 
0.058 
(3.01) 
(***) 
0.144 
(4.78) 
(***) 
Intercept �1 0.290 (9.11) 
(***) 
0.227 
(5.49) 
(***) 
0.305 
(25.18) 
(***) 
0.302 
(14.71) 
(***) 
0.50 
(2.37) 
(***) 
-0.038 
(-0.61) 
0.154 
(0.81) 
Number of foreign 
players 
�2 -0.004 (-3.06) 
(***) 
 
-0.004 
(-3.75) 
(***) 
-0.004 
(-2.85) 
(***) 
-0.004 
(-2.73) 
(***) 
-0.005 
(-2.60) 
(***) 
-0.008 
(-1.67) 
(*) 
-0.012 
(-1.29) 
Total number of 
players 
�3 0.009 (5.46) 
(***) 
0.010 
(14.04) 
(***) 
0.009 
(5.16) 
(***) 
0.009 
(5.23) 
(***) 
0.01 
(4.39) 
(***) 
0.007 
(4.71) 
(***) 
0.015 
(5.77) 
(***) 
%  goalkeepers �4 0.438 (2.37) 
(***) 
0.226 
(2.60) 
0.499 
(2.68) 
(***) 
0.496 
(2.55) 
(***) 
0.57 
(2.48) 
(***) 
-0.125 
(-0.70) 
-1.004 
(-1.76) 
(*) 
%  defenders �5 0.016 (0.13) 
0.112 
(1.03) 
0.019 
(0.16) 
0.019 
(0.16) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
0.077 
(0.84) 
-0.357 
(-1.24) 
%  midfielders �6 0.024 (0.24) 
0.102 
(1.16) 
0.028 
(0.27) 
0.023 
(0.23) 
0.03 
(0.20) 
-0.125 
(-1.36) 
-0.448 
(-1.88) 
(*) 
Number of high 
scoring players 
�7 -0.022 (-3.19) 
(***) 
-0.028 
(-4.48) 
(***) 
-0.021 
(-3.00) 
(***) 
-0.021 
(-3.24) 
(***) 
-0.02 
(-2.14) 
(***) 
-0.018 
(-2.79) 
(***) 
-0.088 
(-6.30) 
(***) 
Manager quality �8 -0.441 (-9.38) 
(***) 
-0.527 
(-
13.95) 
(***) 
-0.458 
(-
10.21) 
(***) 
-0.458 
(-9.79) 
(***) 
-0.49 
(-7.71) 
(***) 
-0.099 
(-2.83) 
(***) 
-0.350 
(-2.37) 
(***) 
Manager 
experience 
�9 -0.0003 (0.09) 
0.002 
(0.65) 
0.0001 
(0.04) 
-0.0002 
(-0.05) 
-0.004 
(-0.97) 
0.004 
(2.06) 
(***) 
0.008 
(1.82) 
(*) 
Foreign manager �10 0.016 (1.14) 
0.020 
(5.28) 
(***) 
0.016 
(1.09) 
0.016 
(1.07) 
0.02 
(1.12) 
0.002 
(0.17) 
-0.052 
(-2.29) 
(***) 
New Manager �11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.02 
(-1.51) 
(*) 
 
 
-0.078 
(-3.16) 
(***) 
Composed error 
variance 
�2 0.006 
(12.37) 
(***) 
0.004 
(28.14) 
(***) 
0.006 
(12.54) 
(***) 
0.006 
(22.52) 
(***) 
0.006 
(10.60) 
(***) 
0.008 
(11.72) 
(***) 
0.011 
(7.97) 
(***) 
Proportion of 
error variance 
due to technical 
inefficiencies 
� 1.00 
(8.14) 
(***) 
1.00 
(15.26) 
(***) 
1.00 
(86.13) 
(***) 
1.00 
(32.23) 
(***) 
0.90 
(9.91) 
(***) 
0.00000001 
(0.02) 
0.308 
(2.81) 
(***) 
Log-likelihood  341.23 319.83 339.00 339.08 260.95 267.09 230.60 
Observations  296  236  296 296  232 274  233 
 
(1) Estimation including all teams in the top division. (2) Estimation excluding observations from seasons 2004/05, 
2005/06 and 2006/07. (3) Estimation similar to (1) but variable ‘Capital’ refers to the capital of any Italian province. 
(4) Estimation similar to (1) but variable ‘Capital’ refers to any of the 4 biggest Italian cities. (5) Estimation similar 
to (1) but including the variable “new manager” in the estimation and dropping teams that were in the second division the 
previous year. t-values are shown between brackets. ***, **, * denotes rejection at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance 
level respectively. 
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Table  4.  Stochastic  Production  Frontier  Estimation  for 
different measures of city size.
Italy Chile
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Intercept β00.76(17.32)
(***)
0.78
(9.28)
(***)
0.38
(12.87)
(***)
0.39
(21.49)
(***)
3 points dummy β10.05(2.83)
(***)
0.05
(3.24)
(***)
0.04
(2.24)
(***)
0.04
(1.89)
(*)
Capital β20.02(1.09)
-0.06
(-1.65)
(*)
0.05
(3.56)
(***)
0.06
(3.91)
(***)
International 
tournament β3
0.01
(0.71)
0.01
(0.53)
0.04
(1.84)
(*)
0.04
(2.11)
(**)
Stadium capacity β44.12(1.37)
-2.90
(-1.07)
5.96
(3.95)
(***)
5.00
(3.36)
(***)
Size of city β50.000001(0.71)
0.00002
(2.77)
(***)
0.00001
(2.54)
(***)
0.0003
(1.54)
Champion in previous 
years β6
-0.01
(-0.49)
-0.01
(-0.83)
0.03
(1.37)
0.04
(1.61)
Performance in 
previous years β7
0.03
(1.63)
0.03
(1.76)
(*)
0.06
(2.88)
(***)
0.07
(3.52)
(***)
Intercept δ1 0.29(4.60)
(***)
0.28
(6.70)
(***)
-0.20
(-1.32)
-0.14
(-0.97)
Number of foreign 
players δ 2
-0.004
(-2.59)
(***)
-0.004
(-2.57)
(***)
-0.02
(-2.79)
(***)
-0.02
(-2.87) 
(***)
Total number of 
players δ3
0.01
(5.22)
(***)
0.01
(5.38)
(***)
0.01
(5.43)
(***)
0.01
(6.13)
(***)
%  goalkeepers δ 4 0.45(2.17)
(***)
0.44
(2.26) 
(***)
-0.35
(-1.06)
-0.46
(-1.17)
(*)
%  defenders δ5 0.03(0.21)
0.02
(0.18)
0.27
(1.23)
0.14
(0.63)
%  midfielders δ6 0.04(0.39)
0.03
(0.31)
-0.02
(-0.11)
-0.05
(-0.30)
Number of high 
scoring players δ 7
-0.02
(-2.94) 
(***)
-0.02
(-3.04)
(***)
-0.05
(-4.17)
(***)
-0.04
(-3.19)
(***)
Manager quality δ8 -0.45(-8.98)
(***)
-0.44
(-8.93)
(***)
-0.18
(-3.43)
(***)
-0.19
(-2.67)
(***)
Manager experience δ9 0.0005(-0.18)
0.0006
(-0.19)
0.01
(2.99)
(***)
0.01
(3.29)
(***)
Foreign manager δ100.01(0.86)
0.01
(1.00)
-0.02
(-0.97)
-0.01
(-0.63)
Composed error 
variance σ
2 0.01
(12.46) 
(***)
0.01
(12.75)
(***)
0.01
(8.98)
(***)
0.01
(9.55)
(***)
Proportion of error 
variance due to 
technical 
inefficiencies
γ 1.00(3.83) 
(***)
1.00
(1.86)
(*)
0.11
(0.95)
0.10
(1.47)
Log-likelihood 337.34 340.43 272.71 271.23
Observations 296 296 274 274
All estimation includes the baseline specification. Estimation (1) considers per-capita income of the city and estimation 
(2) the total income of the city as the measure of city size. 
***, **, * denotes rejection at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance level respectively. 
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1 We are grateful to participants at the First European Conference in Sport Economics in Paris for helpful  
comments. We would also like to thank A.M. Palomba and M. Iturrieta for assistance with data compilation and to the  
Centro de Estudios del  Deporte (CEPED) for providing us with valuable information on the Chilean League.  The 
second and third authors acknowledge the financial support of MIUR-PRIN 2008 and Fondazione Banco di Sardegna.
2 Note that this estimation would be consistent with the log transformation of a Cobb-Douglas functional form 
such as  exp (Y i , t )=∏
i=1
K
(exp (xi ,t ) )
βi∗exp (ν i ,t+υi , t )  where  x i ,t=1  and  β i  is the ith component of 
vector β .
3 In addition, distortions will result if high quality players are willing to accept a lower wage at a `big' club. 
4 We also tried with an ad-hoc definition of capital for Italy: the city of Milan where two of the most important 
football  teams  play,  Internazionale  di  Milano  and  A.C.  Milan,  however  this  variable  was  not  significant  at  the 
conventional levels.
5
 As a potential indicator of market size we also considered the ratio of city size over the number of teams in the  
city however this variables turned out to be not significant what suggests that at least in the long run the size of the 
market in a given city is not exogenously given but it could be stimulated by the competition of rival neighbor teams.
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